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Studies & Analyses No. 268 – I. HashiAbstract
The development of market economies in Central and Eastern Europe, and the
imminent accession of some of these countries to EU membership, has only strengthened
the view that corporate governance is of fundamental importance to the process of
transition and to the economic regeneration and growth of former socialist countries.
The  paper  identifies  the  differences  between  the  systems  of  corporate  governance
existing in various transition countries. It aims at comparing the legal framework for
corporate governance in selected transition economies in order to highlight the progress
made so far as well as the shortcomings of the existing framework. 
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We  define  “corporate  governance” as  the  set  of  rules  and  mechanisms
governing the behaviour of a firm which ensures that shareholders, investors and
creditors are protected from abuse by managers and large stakeholders and
have  sufficient  incentive  to  supply  the  firm  with  finance  and  credit.  The
development  of  market  economies  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  and  the
imminent accession of some of these countries to EU membership, has only
strengthened  the  view  that  “corporate  governance” is  of  fundamental
importance to the process of transition and to the economic regeneration and
growth of former socialist countries. Indeed, fourteen years of “post-socialist”
development  has  shown  that  as  the  institutions  of  the  new  market  system
develop,  more  advanced,  complex  and  intricate  mechanisms  of  corporate
governance are needed to ensure the protection of shareholders, investors and
creditors  who  are  the  vital  agents  of  a  dynamic  economy.  The  “needed
mechanisms of corporate governance”, initially highlighted by Frydman, et al.
(1993) are even more important now that these countries have established a
market system and, at least some of them, are nearing the end of the transition
phase.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that effective corporate governance is
established  either  through  a  well  developed  legal  framework  and  an  active
capital  market,  or  through  concentrated  ownership.  In  an  extension  of  this
argument, La Porta, et al. (1997 and 1998) argued that in countries with better
legal protection of shareholders, financial markets are more developed and firms
have greater access to external finance and better opportunities for growth.2
This analysis was extended to transition economies by Pistor, et al. (2000) by
highlighting the effectiveness and impact of legal institutions on external finance.
While La Porta et al.’s work was concerned with the analysis of “anti-director”
6
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1 I am grateful to colleagues and friends in many transition economies who helped with the preparation of
questionnaires, to Mrs. Jenny Herbert who provided assistance with collection and compilation of the data and
sifting through the legal matters, and to Ms. Zorica Kalezic for her help as a research assistant.
2 Similarly, in a comparison of the regulations governing the Polish and Czech stock exchanges, Gleaser, 
et  al.  (2001)  showed  that  because  of  the  regulations  protecting  the  interests  of  investors  and  minority
shareholders, it was possible to raise over a billion dollars of finance for new and existing firms in Poland and
launch 138 IPOs (until 1998) while none of this was possible on the Prague Stock Exchange.rights of shareholders, Pistor’s work focused on additional dimensions such as
the legal provisions for voice and exit, and the ability of shareholders to resist
block-holders.
Furthermore, the interpretation of the traditional agency problem (i.e., the
conflict between owners and managers) was extended by the work of La Porta
et al. (1999), Berglof and von Thadden (1999) and Pistor et al. (2000) to cover
other  conflicts  of  interest  in  firms  (e.g.,  the  conflicts  between  minority
shareholders and controlling shareholders, between shareholders and workers,
or between managers and creditors). La Porta, et al. (1999), e.g., showed that
large companies around the world are generally dominated by concentrated
ownership  (families  or  governments)  and  that  the  protection  of  minority
shareholders from (potentially) expropriating dominant shareholders lies at the
heart of the corporate governance problem. 
The  ownership  transformation  process  embarked  on  in  many  transition
economies,  especially  those  undergoing  mass  privatisation,  gave  rise  to  an
initially dispersed ownership structure in mass privatised firms. However, since
the mid-1990s, these firms have been undergoing a rapid increase in ownership
concentration.  The  process  of  ownership  concentration  in  mass  privatised
companies in Poland, Hungary and Slovenia has been demonstrated in detail by
Blaszczyk, et al. (2003) – in the Czech Republic, e.g., nearly half of the Czech
firms privatised in the mass privatisation scheme now have a dominant owner
controlling over 50% of shares (Grosfeld and Hashi, 2003). A similar conclusion
was arrived at by Berglof and Pajuste (2003) who focussed on the concentration
of both ownership rights and control rights in large listed companies in twelve
transition  countries  (including  all  accession  countries).  This  increased
concentration  of  ownership  and  control,  and  the  emergence  of  dominant
owners for firms in transition economies have highlighted the importance of
corporate governance mechanisms, particularly those relating to the protection
of  minority  shareholders  and  the  disclosure  and  transparency  requirements
expected of the management – in short, the “voice” and “exit” mechanisms.3
7
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3 For a discussion of voice and exit mechanisms, see Roe (1993) and Hashi (1998). The only exception to
the generally accepted increased importance of corporate governance is Mihalyi (2002) who argued that with
the  growth  of  multinational  companies  activities  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  and  the  accession  to  EU
membership, corporate governance becomes rather “irrelevant”. However, the limited influence of foreign
firms in transition economies on the one hand and the continued interest in corporate governance codes and
regulations in Western market economies on the other, particularly in the light of the Enron and Worldcom
scandals, contradict Mihaly’s view.In developed market economies the discussion of corporate governance and
the need for improvements in the regulatory framework has continued. The
OECD  and  EU  member  states,  as  well  as  multinational  professional
organisations, have all produced codes of obligatory and voluntary behaviour for
improvements in the corporate governance system.4 The legal framework and
voluntary arrangements developed in these countries provide a bench mark
from which transition economies can learn. 
This paper aims at comparing the legal framework for corporate governance
in selected transition economies in order to highlight the progress made so far
as well as the shortcomings of the existing framework. The paper identifies the
differences between the systems of corporate governance in various transition
countries. The paper is divided into five sections. Each of the next three sections
considers  a  particular  aspect  of  the  corporate  governance  framework  as
practiced in the selected countries. These are: shareholders’ rights; equitable
treatment of all shareholders; and the responsibilities of company boards. These
sections broadly correspond to the first three headings of the OECD Principles
as well as other interested organisations (see footnote 3 for details). The paper
ends with a conclusion.
The  data  for  the  analysis  of  each  section  was  collected  through  a
questionnaire on various aspects of corporate governance completed separately
for  each  country.  The  respondents  were  lawyers,  economists,  academics,
researchers and stock market participants, i.e., professionals involved in the
study  and/or  practice  of  corporate  governance  (see  Appendix  1  for
Questionnaire). 
2. Shareholders’ Rights
Shareholders’ rights are the subject of Principle I of the OECD code of good
practice  and  are  fundamental  to  any  corporate  governance  system.  The
separation of ownership and control and the potential principal-agent conflict in
8
Studies & Analyses No. 268 – I. Hashi
4 For a detailed comparative study of the regulatory framework in EU countries, see OECD (2002). Of
particular relevance to this discussion are: the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD, 1999); the
International Corporate Governance Network’s statement on corporate governance principles (ICGN, 1999);
the European Association of Securities Dealers’ corporate governance principles and recommendations (EASD,
2000); and the Euroshareholders Corporate Governance Guidelines 2000.joint stock companies underline the importance of emphasising shareholders’
rights, especially the right to participate in the company’s important decisions
made at general or extraordinary meetings of shareholders. In order for this
right to be exercised, the legal framework must establish procedures by which
shareholders are duly informed of such meetings, in good time, so they can take
part  in  the  decisions  of  the  company  without  any  inconvenience  or  cost5.
Furthermore, it is crucial that their geographic proximity to the company does
not affect their ability to participate in the decision-making process. 
The implementation of these provisions require, firstly, a secure register of
shareholders and, secondly, the availability of postal voting and proxy voting
9
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voting  Notice of meetings 
Albania  Yes  No  Yes
b  Media or letters to 
shareholders 
Bulgaria  No  No  Yes  Notice in State Gazette 
Czech Republic  Yes  No  Yes (power 
of attorney 
necessary) 
One national paper or 
letters to shareholders 
Lithuania    Yes
a  Yes
a  Media or letters to 
shareholders 
Macedonia  No  Yes  Yes  Public announcement or 
invitation letters 
Poland  Yes  No  Yes
c  Announcement method 
not specified
d 
Romania  Yes  No  Yes (power 
of attorney 
necessary) 
Notice in State Gazette 
and a newspaper or by 
letters to shareholders
e 
Russia  Yes  Yes  Yes  By registered letters to 
shareholders
f 
Slovenia  Yes  No  Yes  Notice in national 
papers or company 
website 
Notes:
a Only if the provision is allowed in the company’s articles of incorporation. 
b Companies with more than 50 employees only.
c On the regulated segment of the market.
d Notice of meeting may however be by letters to shareholders if shares are named shares.
e If shares are named shares.
f Or as the company charter determines (e.g., by invitation in the newspapers or television).
5 OECD  Principle  II.A.3  states  that  companies  should  not  make  it  unduly  difficult  or  expensive  for
shareholders to vote at the general meetings.options. While most of these requirements are common practice in OECD
countries,  they  are  not  legal  requirements  in  transition  economies  and  in
practice many of them fall short of meeting these criteria. Table 1 summarises
the  legal  position  on  some  aspects  of  shareholders’  rights  in  selected
countries.6
Clearly  there  are  diverse  arrangements  for  owners’  participation  in
decision  making  in  different  countries  although,  in  most  areas,  there  is  a
noticeable  trend  towards  conformity  with  OECD  principles.  Independent
share  registers  seem  to  exist  in  most  countries,  especially  the  accession
countries.  Information  on  meetings  is  often  communicated  via  the  media
rather than by letters sent to individual shareholders. Given the wide use of
“bearer shares”, this seems to be a reasonable deviation.7 The opportunity for
postal voting is generally still not available in most countries and proxy voting,
though technically possible, in many countries is often subject to the additional
condition that the proxy must have an official power of attorney. Furthermore
in  some  countries  shares  have  to  be  deposited  with  a  third  party  for  a
minimum period before the shareholders’ meetings. These restrictions clearly
weaken the ability of shareholders to participate and influence the company’s
decisions.  Moreover,  they  provide  fertile  ground  for  abuse  by  controlling
shareholders.
3. Equitable Treatment of All Shareholders 
The OECD code recommends that all shareholders (minority or majority;
foreign or domestic) of each type of share be treated equally. An important
aspect of “equal treatment” is the concept of “one share-one vote” which is
practiced in many, though not all, OECD countries. According to this Anglo-
American  practice,  all  shares  should  have  equal  voting  rights  in  order  to
provide owners with proportionate power to influence the decisions of the
10
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6 Another aspect of shareholders’ rights is the right to be properly informed of the financial position of the
company  and  material  factors  which  may  influence  this  position.  This  will  be  discussed  later,  under  the
responsibilities of the boards.
7 A related issue of some concern, especially in transition economies, is the existence of “bearer shares”
which  are  very  common.  Naturally,  with  these  shares,  the  possibility  of  proxy  voting  or  postal  voting  is
significantly limited as the company has no access to the identity of owners. company. In many countries (including OECD countries), other practices such
as non-voting shares, shares with greater voting power, etc. are common. In
some  countries  there  is  a  cap  on  the  voting  rights  of  large  shareholders,
effectively giving their shares less voting rights than that of minority holders. In
these circumstances, minority shareholders exercise undue influence over the
decision-making process. The OECD Principles do not choose one practice in
preference  to  another,  though  in  some  countries  different  types  of  voting
shares are either discouraged or being abandoned altogether (e.g., Denmark
and Greece). ICGN (1999), also regards any deviation from one share-one
vote as undesirable.
Another  aspect  of  equal  treatment  is  the  treatment  of  minority
shareholders  in  particular,  who  may  be  the  target  of  opportunistic  and
sometimes  fraudulent  behaviour  by  majority  shareholders.  Indeed,  the
question of equitable treatment becomes crucial when large shareholders can
exercise  greater  control  rights  than  warranted  by  their  ownership  rights
(either because of the dispersion of the shareholding or through the multiple
voting right of some shares).8 For this reason, specific mechanisms are needed
to ensure that all shareholders are treated the same. Minority shareholders
can  be  protected  in  a  number  of  ways:  (i)  the  socalled  “super-majority”
requirement  for  certain  important  proposals  put  to  the  assembly  of
shareholders  which  enables  minorities  to  block  certain  decisions  (such  as
capital increase, liquidation, mergers, etc.); (ii) the imposition of a quorum for
shareholder  meetings;  (iii)  the  allocation  of  a  seat  on  the  board  to  the
representative of minority shareholders (the cumulative voting procedure);
(iv) the entitlement to buy shares in proportion to one’s current shareholding
when the company’s capital is increased and new shares are issued (the so-
called “pre-emptive right”); (v) the right to embark on legal action against the
management on the basis of “duty of care” (the so-called oppressed minority
rule).9 Table 2 summarises the legal framework for the equal treatment of all
shareholders and the protection of the minority. Here, too, most transition
economies fall short of OECD recommendations.
11
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8 Interestingly in many EU countries (notably Austria, Belgium, Germany and Italy), a majority of listed
companies have controlling shareholders with ownership stakes in excess of 50% of shares (Barca and Brecht,
2001).
9 This list is not exhaustive but contains some of the more common ways of protecting the minority against
abuse by large stakeholders.Clearly, all countries have made some attempt to devise and improve their
legal  framework  to  ensure  the  equal  treatment  of  shareholders  including
minority shareholders. The “one share – one vote” principle seems to be the
norm  in  most  countries.  In  terms  of  minority  shareholders’  rights,  most
countries impose a quorum and a supermajority requirement on the meetings of
shareholders – though the accession countries seem to have less strict rules than
non-accession countries in some areas (lower quorum for assemblies, and lower
percentage of votes for decisions requiring supermajority).10 Pre-emptive rights
are observed in almost all countries (with the notable exception of Poland11) and
the  oppressed  minority  rule  is  on  the  statute  book  in  most  countries  too.
12
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Albania Yes 51% 75% No No No
Bulgaria Yes None 67% Yes No No
Czech Rep Yes
b 30% 67%
d Yes Yes No
Lithuania Yes 50% 66% Yes
f
Macedonia No 50%
c 75% Yes No No
Poland No None 67%
e No Yes Yes
Romania Yes 50% 75% Yes
g Yes Yes
h
Russia Yes 50% 75% Yes Yes No
Slovenia Yes None 75% Yes Yes No
Notes:
a In the course of privatisation in some countries, the so-called “golden shares” were created, giving the
government (as the holder of the golden share) additional powers. These are excluded from the table.
b But it is possible to impose a cap on the voting rights of individual shareholders.
c 50% of shares with voting rights.
d For delisting, a supermajority of 75% is required.
e Other important decisions require 75%, 80% and 90% of votes.
f Unless the AGM decides otherwise (a supermajority of 75% is required)
g Not a legal requirement but may be included in the Company charter.
h This is possible in law but has not been practiced yet.
10 In the light of the possibility of abuse by minority, and in the presence of better legal framework, these
seemingly less restrictive measures may not be too significant (see next paragraph). It should be added that, in
some countries, some decisions of the boards require higher super-majority levels than indicated in Table 2 (for
example in Lithuania a resolution aiming to withdraw shareholders’ pre-emptive rights require a 75% majority).
11 It should be noted that the Polish law allows for companies to introduce “pre-emptive” rights (if they so
wish) but, unlike other countries, it does not impose this restriction on companies. The same thing applies to
the quorum for the assembly of shareholders.Interestingly, only in Poland and Romania are minority shareholders entitled to
one seat on company boards (though the provision is not commonly used in
practice  in  Romania).  The  ability  of  minority  shareholders  to  sue  the
management for violation of the “duty of care’ principle has occasionally led to
the abuse of the litigation process by the minority. Although such abuse is rare
(see Blaszczyk, Hoshi and Woodward 2003 for examples), policy makers should
be aware of its potential existence and formulate mechanisms to discourage it.12
4. Disclosure, Transparency and Responsibilities of Company
Boards
Company boards are where the interests of shareholders, block-holders and
managers  are  articulated.  They  are  also  the  place  where  different  types  of
conflict of interest manifest themselves. For this reason, and following a number
of inquiries and reports on the subject, many OECD countries have opted for
provisions requiring a certain proportion of companies’ board members (either
on  boards  of  directors  or  supervisory  boards)  to  be  “independent” of  the
company  and  its  shareholders.  These  board  members  can  claim  genuine
independence from managers and large shareholders (who usually elect their
own nominees to company boards) so that they can make impartial judgements
when conflicts of interest arise. Various codes of good practice strongly advocate
the  presence  of  a  reasonable  number  of  “independent” or  “non-executive”
directors on boards, numerous enough to maintain the boards’ independence on
crucial  issues  and  conflicts  of  interest.  Almost  all  transition  economies  have
employed  the  so-called  German  model  of  the  two-tier  board  system  (a
supervisory board and a management board).13 Although, technically, there is a
separation of functions within the two boards so that members of the former
are almost by definition not involved in the day to day management of the
13
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12 In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 75% super-majority requirement of the Enterprise Law of Republika Srpska,
has resulted in the inability of majority shareholders to change the inefficient managers and board members.
The same law also allows for minority stakeholders to have a seat on the supervisory board.
13 Needless  to  say,  the  two  boards  may  be  called  differently  in  different  countries  (e.g.,  Board  of
Administration in Romania and Board of Directors in Russia, instead of supervisory board) though their essential
features remain the same. The only exception to the two-tier board system is in Kosovo where the Regulation
on Business Organisations (UNMIK 2001) establishes an Anglo-American style unitary board of directors for
joint stock companies, though allowing the shareholders’ meeting to decide on other board models.  In Bulgaria
too, at the early stage of transition, companies could choose either type of board.company  (i.e.,  they  are  non-executive),  nevertheless  they  remain  the
representative of the owners – actually, large block-holding owners rather than
all owners. The concept of “independent” members is very new and has still not
found its way into the normal practice of even large companies in most transition
countries.
Investment decision making by prospective investors as well as the effective
operation of the market for corporate control and managerial labour market
require accurate and timely information on various aspects of performance and
ownership of companies. The responsibility for providing such information lies
ultimately  with  company  boards.  Precisely  for  this  reason,  companies  are
required to publish accounts certified by independent auditors on a regular basis,
while companies listed on the stock exchange are required to publish more
detailed accounts more frequently.
Additionally, members of the boards and management are bound by various
“insider dealing” laws aimed at preventing those privy to confidential and price
sensitive information from using such information for their own gains. Also in
order to minimise the abuse of power by board members, audit committees,
remuneration committees and nomination committees, largely or wholly made
up  of  independent  members  of  the  boards,  are  given  the  responsibility  for
overseeing the preparation of financial statements of companies and preparing
proposals  on  the  remuneration  of  board  members  and  managers  and
nominations to the boards.
Financial  markets  and  prospective  investors  are  also  concerned  by  the
provision of information on the ownership structure of the company and the
ownership interests of board members. Therefore legal requirements exist not
only to declare the ownership stakes of board members but also to identity the
firm’s large shareholders and any owner reaching a threshold ownership level
(3% in the UK and 5% in most OECD countries). 
Finally, OECD Principle III recognises the rights of other “stakeholders” in a
company  and  encourages  cooperation  between  companies  and  their
stakeholders. The main stakeholders of companies are identified as employees,
customers, creditors, suppliers and governments. Of these groups, employees
have been selected for special treatment and offered various rights such as
consultation  and  representation  at  supervisory  board  level.  In  transition
economies, the situation is rather mixed. Although in countries with a history of
employee participation (such as former Yugoslavia and Poland), it was natural for
employees  to  be  represented  at  board  level,  some  countries  without  that
background  have  also  adopted  the  practice  (e.g.  Czech  Republic).  Table  3
14
Studies & Analyses No. 268 – I. Hashisummarises  some  of  the  characteristics  of  company  boards  and  their
membership, transparency and disclosure requirements in selected transition
economies.
As mentioned earlier, the concept of independent board members is at its
infancy in transition economies (even accession countries) with only Poland and
Russia having a recommendation to engage independent members on boards on
a voluntary basis. Similarly the representation of employees on the supervisory
boards is also rare, with Slovenia and Czech Republic the only countries with
statutory representation of employees at board level. On the other hand, the
need for independent auditors and regular financial reporting is well established
15
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Albania No Yes N/A None None No 3
Bulgaria No
a Yes Quarterly 5% No 3
Czech
Rep.






Macedonia No Yes Quarterly 10% 45% 6
Poland No
b Yes Quarterly 5% 50% Yes 5




c Yes Quarterly 5% 30%+
f Yes 5
Slovenia No Yes Annually 5% Partial
g 8
Notes:
a Except for public companies where 1/3 of the supervisory board must be independent.
b The Code of Good Corporate Governance, however, recommends that 50% of board members should
be independent (for Treasury owned companies, however, the law requires that 3/5 of the board members
should be independent).
c Recommended by the Code of Corporate Conduct but the practice is limited to some of the biggest
companies only.
d Any outsider can find out the identity of shareholders once they reach the 10% threshold.
e A shareholder reaching this threshold must make an offer to buy out other shareholders.
f This obligation may be withdrawn by Company charter or AGM.
g Only total salary bill is disclosed.in all countries under consideration, with some countries even having obligatory
quarterly reporting.
The  disclosure  of  information  about  beneficial  owners  of  a  company  is
recognised in all countries, with most of them now having a threshold of 5%
(and other higher levels). In a majority of cases, the mandatory bid rule (the
obligation  to  make  an  offer  to  buy  out  other  shareholders  once  an  owner
reaches a certain threshold, between 30 and 50%) is also place to ensure that
minority  shareholders  can  exit  without  financial  penalties  if  a  controlling
shareholder enters the scene. However, in some countries such as Russia, the
effectiveness of this provision is reduced by the fact that some beneficial owners
are simply “off shore” companies and the true identity of their owners remains
unknown.  Furthermore,  there  is  anecdotal  evidence  about  the  existence  of
cross  ownership  and  pyramid  holdings  which  also  hide  the  true  identity  of
beneficial owners (see Berglof and Pajuste, 2003 for examples).
The chief executives of companies in transition economies still enjoy a great
deal of power. Their term of office is usually very long, between 3 to 8 years
(mostly 5). In comparison with EU countries, this is rather long – the Cadbury
Committee recommended contracts of 1 to 2 years for chief executives in the
U.K. (Cadbury, 2002). Similarly, as far as the ownership stake and remuneration
of managers and boards are concerned, most countries still maintain a veil of
secrecy and, at best, provide partial information (such as the aggregate value of
managerial  remuneration  and  shareholding)  for  shareholders  investors  and
markets.
In all countries there are legal provisions against the abuse of power by
managers. Almost everywhere they are forbidden by law to engage in actions, in
collusion with others, to artificially manipulate share prices for personal gain. It
is also explicitly against the law to engage in insider trading (the use of price
sensitive information for personal gain). In both cases penalties ranging from
fines,  prison  terms  and  the  loss  of  the  right  to  be  a  company  director  are
available to courts. The implementation and enforcement of legal remedies is, of
course, weak and successful prosecution of a significant number of company
managers has not taken place in the transition countries investigated, despite the
numerous financial scandals and cases of abuse of power – e.g., tunnelling which
resulted in financial crisis in the Czech Republic or the pyramid schemes whose
collapse led to civil unrest in Albania.
Finally,  it  is  important  to  note  that  although  the  legal  framework  for
corporate  governance  in  the  countries  under  consideration  is  fairly  well
developed and comprehensive, it does not mean that their implementation and
16
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law  enforcement  and  implementation  is  a  general  problem  in  transition
countries. Many authors and institutions have reported on the development of
the legal framework and its enforcement in transition economies in the last few
years (La Porta et al., 1997; Pistor et al., 2000; Kaufman et al., 2002; and the
EBRD‘s Transition Reports, among others). These studies provide a ranking of the
legal  framework  especially  the  “rule  of  law” and  the  effectiveness  of  legal
provisions in the financial sector in these countries. Table 4 summarises two of
the recent studies on law enforcement in the countries under consideration.
Clearly, despite much improvement in the legal framework, the general state
of “rule of law” is still far from satisfactory in most countries. Russia, in particular
comes  out  quite  poor  (indeed  with  some  deterioration  of  its  score)  in  the
Kaufman et al.’s study while Poland and Czech Republic seem to be in much
better  position.  In  terms  of  the  effectiveness  of  financial  regulations,  most
countries have improved and reached a satisfactory situation though, in the light
of our investigations, the improvement in 2002 seems rather surprising. Even
then, all countries have still some way to go to reach the position of developed
market economies (which would attract a score of 4+).
5. Conclusions
Effective corporate governance is fundamental to the process of economic
regeneration  in  transition  economies.  It  improves  the  performance  of
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Table 4. Rule of Law and the Effectiveness of Financial Regulations
Rule of Law  Financial Regulations Effectiveness 
Countries 
1997/98  2000/01  1998  2001  2002 
Albania  n.a.  n.a.  2-  2-  3 
Bulgaria  -0.15  0.02  3  3  4 
Czech Rep.  0.54  0.64  3-  3  4- 
Lithuania  0.18  0.29  2  4-  4- 
Macedonia  n.a.  n.a.  2  2  4- 
Poland  0.54  0.55  3  3  4- 
Romania  -0.09  -0.02  3-  3  4 
Russia  -0.72  -0.87  2  2+  4- 
Slovenia  0.83  0.89  3-  4-  4- 
Source: Kaufman et al. (2002); EBRD (1999 and 2002).enterprises  by  aligning  conflicts  of  interest,  and  by  reducing  fraudulent  and
opportunistic  behaviour.  It  enhances  the  quality  of  information  available  to
participants in the capital market and facilitates access to external finance. All
transition economies have made significant progress in developing a corporate
governance framework and are moving towards adopting the OECD Principles
on voluntary or statutory basis. Poland and Russia are amongst the group of
countries with more developed corporate governance practices.
The board system in almost all transition countries is similar to the German
two-tier model with a supervisory board (responsible for the strategic direction
of the company and the supervision and monitoring of the management) and a
management board (dealing with the operational and day-to-day management of
the company). The shareholders’ ability to influence the boards by exercising
their voting rights and participating in the decision making process is, however,
somewhat restricted in many countries. The opportunity for postal voting is
generally non-existent and proxy voting is subject to additional time consuming
requirements such as the power of attorney. Both Poland and Russia need to
make improvements in these areas to encourage and facilitate a wider exercise
of  shareholder  rights.  Another  important  area  of  improvement  is  the
appointment of independent members on supervisory boards, something which
none of the countries under consideration have achieved so far. The codes of
good  corporate  governance  practice  in  both  Russia  and  Poland,  however,
recommend that independent members should constitute one-third to one-half
of board membership.
In terms of the protection of minority shareholders, most countries have
adopted measures such as the quorum requirement for shareholder assemblies
and the super-majority requirement for important decisions. Other measures
such as pre-emptive rights, the mandatory bid rule and the oppressed minority
rule are only available in some countries. Poland is the only country where the
minority shareholders are able to pool their votes and elect a member to the
supervisory  board  of  companies,  but  at  the  same  time,  it  is  also  the  only
accession country without the automatic pre-emptive right. This is an area of
improvement which should be considered at the time of the review of the legal
framework. The protection of minority, of course, has to be weighed against the
ability of majority owners to engage in entrepreneurial activities. The abuse of
minority rights is a potential problem that countries have to be aware of and
make legal provisions to avoid without restricting the rights of minority owners.
As far as the rights of other stakeholders are concerned, there are no explicit
references  in  the  corporate  governance  framework  of  any  of  the  countries
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Studies & Analyses No. 268 – I. Hashistudied  –  the  only  exception  being  the  recognition  of  employees’  right  of
representation at supervisory board level in some countries (Czech Republic and
Slovenia, e.g.). There are no provisions for consultation and the involvement of,
or the supply of targeted information to, creditors, suppliers or governments.
The  participation  of  employee  representatives  on  supervisory  boards  is  of
course recommended by the OECD Principles and is practiced in a number of
EU countries. Interestingly in Russia, the practice is common especially in larger
companies though it is not legally required. This is another area of improvement
that  companies  can  make  without  any  adverse  effect  on  the  work  of  their
management bodies.
Finally, in all countries, there are legal remedies for breaches of rules, ranging
from fines to imprisonment and restrictions on the future employment of the
managerial personnel involved. This is very important and necessary, though not
sufficient, for discouraging fraud and misuse of position of influence. However,
while legal provisions are fairly good in most countries, the implementation of
the  legal  framework  or  ‘law  in  practice’  is  far  from  satisfactory.  In  many
countries, basic rules such as the registration of shareholders, information for
assemblies  and  various  rules  designed  to  protect  minority  owners  are  not
observed fully or implemented in a lax manner. In Poland, where rules applying
to companies on the Warsaw Stock Exchange are quite strict, the same is not
true for other companies. In Russia too, the level of implementation, apart from
larger  companies  with  public  presence  is  fairly  low.  The  identity  of  the
beneficiary  owners  of  many  companies  are  hidden  behind  the  “off  shore”
company  formula  which  reduces  the  confidence  of  investors  in  the  laws
governing financial market. It is in this area that authorities need to make further
visible progress to reassure investors and creditors. The EBRD index of legal
effectiveness  shows  a  surprising  improvement  in  all  countries  in  2002  over
previous years. This improvement does not match other researchers’ and the
Bank’s earlier investigations and has to be treated cautiously.
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Mechanisms of Corporate Governance
Participation in Decision Making at the Annual General Meetings of the
Company
1. Is the voting right of all shares equal, i.e., one share one vote? Or, are there
some  categories  of  shares  which  have  a  higher  voting  right  than  other
categories?
2. Is postal voting for the Annual General Meetings possible?
3. Is proxy voting for the Annual General Meeting possible?
4. What is the quorum required for AGM meetings?
5. What is the majority needed for AGM decisions? Is a “supermajority” (e.g.
66% or 75%) needed for some important decisions? Examples?
6. How is the AGM announced to shareholders? In newspapers (what kind of
papers – national, regional, etc.?) or by sending letters to shareholders?
Supervisory  Board  (or  Board  of  Directors  in  Russia)  and  Management
Board (or Executive Board)
1. Are there “independent” directors on the Supervisory Board? Is the practice
common?
2. Are employees represented on the Supervisory Board or the Management
Board?  What  proportion  of  Board  members  are  employees?  Is  this
representation required by law?
3. What is the usual tenure (length of office) of the General Manager of the Co.?
4. Can the Supervisory Board, or the Management Board or employees stop a
hostile takeover?
Minority shareholders’ rights
1. Can owners of substantial minority stakes elect a board member? Or is 51%
of votes sufficient to elect a Supervisory Board member?
2. Does the ownership of 33% of shares entitle the owner to any specific rights
(e.g., vetoing certain decisions of the Board, or electing a member to the Board)?
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Studies & Analyses No. 268 – I. Hashi3. Can minority owners take legal action against directors for some of their
decisions (oppressed minority rule)? 
4. In case of capital increase, do existing shareholders have automatic right to buy
new shares – and only if they refuse to do so, these shares can be sold to others?
Transparency and Monitoring Issues
1. What is the threshold for the legal requirement to disclose the identity of
shareholders? (5%, 10%, 33%, 50%?)
2. Is it possible to have “nominee shareholders” and is it required by law to
disclose the identity of the real owner or the nominee?
3. Is there a requirement to make an offer to all shareholders once important
ownership thresholds are passed (33% or 50%)?
4. How frequently is the reporting requirement (annual, quarterly, monthly?) for
companies  quoted  on  the  stock  market  and  those  not  quoted?  Is  the
requirement of the Stock Exchange more stringent than that required by law
for companies not quoted on the Exchange.
5. Are salaries, bonuses, and shareholding of top managers and Supervisory Board
members reported in the annual accounts of the company – or elsewhere?
6. Is there a legal requirement for Joint Stock Companies to be audited by
independent auditors?
Others
1.  Are  share  prices  on  the  stock  exchange  different  from  trading  off  the
exchange? Are a significant amount of shares traded off the exchange?
2. Is it explicitly against the law for the managers to engage in collusion with other
parties  to  artificially  change  the  share  prices?  If  so,  what  is  the  penalty  for
infringement? Fines, suspension from managerial posts for a period of time, or jail?
3.  Is  it  explicitly  against  the  law  for  those  involved  in  share  trading  to  use
confidential  information  (insider  trading)?  If  so,  what  is  the  penalty  for
infringement?
4. Is there an independent share registry in operation? What is it called? Is it the
responsibility of a joint stock company or its shareholders to keep the share
registry informed of any changes in ownership (above a certain level)?
5. How seriously are the laws on above issues enforced? 
6. Is there a law requiring companies to pay shareholders a % of their profits as
dividends.
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